On 7 December 2016 and in the days thereafter, the voters and political leaders of Ghana rose to a challenge and met an important democratic test. They peacefully carried out a high-stakes, highly competitive election that many had feared would strain their country's political stability to the breaking point, and then saw to it that power changed hands from the incumbents to their rivals in an orderly and lawful fashion.
Despite peaceful transfers of power in 2000 and 2008, mounting political tensions and concern that the election's outcome would be disputed had led a majority of citizens to worry that violence would break out. 1 However, just a few days after the polls closed, public apprehension turned to pride as all parties accepted the results. This peaceful resolution occurred even though the ruling party lost both the presidency and its majority in Ghana's unicameral, 275-member Parliament. In the presidential vote, Nana Akufo-Addo of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) won a first-round majority of 54 percent over the incumbent, John Mahama of the National Democratic Congress (NDC). This was the first time that a sitting Ghanaian president had been voted out. All previous opposition victories had come when the two-term limit set by the 1992 Constitution had forced the ruling party to run a fresh candidate. In Parliament, the NDC saw its majority vanish as the NPP gained 48 seats to claim a total of 171-a legislative majority of 33.
Before, during, and after the voting, we conducted field research in three diverse locales. These were Asante Akim in the south-central Ashanti Region, an NPP stronghold; Ho in the eastern Volta Region, an NDC stronghold; and the port city of Cape Coast, a "swing" constituency located on the Gulf of Guinea in the Central Region. Online commentary and our conversations in Ghana suggest that, partisanship aside, Ghanaians broadly agreed on the fairness of the process and felt that it had represented the will of the people. Indeed, the elections confirmed both the willingness of the electorate to reject a poorly performing government, and the commitment of political elites to play by the rules of the game-crucial elements for the consolidation of Ghana's democracy. Charges that Charlotte Osei, the new head of the Electoral Commission (EC), would favor the ruling party were not borne out.
Can this democratic success in one West African country tell us about the state of democracy elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa? We believe that it can help to fill in a neglected part of the larger picture. To date, the advantages of incumbency and the "menu of manipulation" have tended to dominate analyses of African elections. 2 Far less attention has been devoted to the conditions under which opposition parties win power. There are good reasons for this. Writing in these pages in 2010, Nic Cheeseman found that electoral playing fields across the continent were so unbalanced that incumbents had won 88 percent of the elections that they contested-with transfers of power much more likely to occur in races for open seats. 3 While this general pattern persists, Mahama's loss in Ghana plus the recent defeats of sitting presidents in Nigeria and (despite temporary resistance) the Gambia suggest that incumbents are also facing new threats to their hold on power. Ghana, admittedly, is an unusual case among African states given its relatively consistent transfers of power since 1992, when multipartism was restored following more than a dozen years of one-party rule under air force officer and two-time coup leader Jerry Rawlings. Nonetheless, institutional and societal challenges similar to those that undermined President Mahama and the NDC now confront many African chief executives. In particular, recent transfers of power have been driven by deteriorating economic conditions, opposition learning, more effective and dynamic electoral processes, and increasingly assertive voters.
These developments make for much more competitive elections, but the final outcome still depends on the willingness of leaders to keep playing by democratic rules. When they do, as in Ghana's and Nigeria's most recent elections, incumbents are likely to lose their seats. When they do not, as in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, the result is instead greater repression, as presidents seek to insulate themselves from the rising risk of defeat. The factors that account for recent opposition victories thus also help to explain an upsurge in attacks on civil liberties across much of the continent. 4 In the months leading up to the 2016 elections, hand-painted signs reading "No Lights No Votes" started to appear in parts of rural Ghana. 5 The story behind these signs shows how economic disappointments and increasingly assertive voters converged to undermine the ruling party's grip on power. Ghana's economy has grown fairly steadily over the last two decades, and GDP growth is expected to rise from 4.1 percent in 2015 to 5.4 percent in 2016. These trends fueled popular expectations that the Mahama government could not meet, especially after low prices and production problems hit the oil sector. 6 Then a series of power shortages highlighted Ghana's infrastructure woes and crimped job creation.
Ordinary Ghanaians have keenly felt the impact of economic difficulties. Inflation has driven up the prices of key goods by about 17 percent in each of the last three years. Despite the strong growth figures, moreover, youth unemployment is now estimated to be 48 percent. Many young people are finding that they must continue living with their parents well into adulthood.
Economic Difficulties and Assertive Voters
Popular frustration with economic hardships would not have altered the course of the election if voters had simply turned out en masse for their ethnic representative or party. Members of the Akan ethnic group-the largest single such group at about 45 percent of the population-would have backed the NPP, which has historically represented their interests. Members of the 15 percent Ewe minority, meanwhile, would have remained loyal to the NDC. In reality, Ghana's votersmuch like their counterparts in other African states-are more sophisticated than this. The "No Lights No Votes" signs, carefully placed along roads so that traveling politicians would be sure to see them, appeared not in opposition areas, but in the Volta Region-an NDC bastion. In this context, they were less a declaration of voting intentions than a demand for more responsive government coming straight from the ruling party's core social base.
The message to ruling-party leaders was clear: Do not take votes for granted. Such public expressions of discontent reflect three interrelated trends. First, successive transfers of power in Ghana have helped to persuade voters that poorly performing governments can be replaced. More specifically, the willingness of political elites to respect key democratic rules has lowered the stakes of electoral contests, because losing parties believe that they will have an opportunity to win power again in the future. At the same time, political candidates typically avoid explicitly ethnic appeals, preferring to talk instead about national-level policy goals such as industrialization and jobs. This has kept a divisive, winner-takes-all style of politics from taking hold in Ghana. In turn, this depolarization has given Ghanaian voters of all stripes the space to be more critical of their own leaders.
Second, voter expectations are changing in a country distinguished by the repeated experience of competitive elections and relatively high education levels (the literacy rate tops 75 percent). Indeed, some studies have argued that a significant number of Ghanaians have abandoned clientelism in favor of an "evaluative" approach to politics-one that prioritizes collective goods such as health clinics over private goods such as cash handouts. 7 Others insist that clientelism still dominates. 8 In our view, the lesson of the recent elections is not that evaluative behavior has displaced clientelism, but that voters increasingly approach politics with an attitude that might be described as an evaluative clientelism, shaped by rising expectations and enabled by a relatively robust electoral system.
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A nationally representative survey of 2,700 Ghanaians conducted in December 2015 showed that vote buying is widely accepted by the Ghanaian public. 10 Indeed, during the campaign, candidates and their support teams distributed cash, T-shirts, rubber boots, second-hand clothes, prepaid electricity meters, and widely used hand tools such as machetes (known locally as "cutlasses"). Many Ghanaian voters expect small gifts as a basic requirement for entering into a conversation about supporting a given party. This, however, is only the first part of a more complex negotiation, and it does not guarantee a voter's support. As a result, while the NDC gave out more money and gifts than the NPP, the ruling party still struggled to mobilize the support that it had enjoyed in previous polls.
Third, an increasingly open political atmosphere has made it easier for political parties and leaders to campaign in the heartlands of their rivals. Thus, seasoned political activists in Ho Central constituency recalled how opposition activists were forced to campaign "underground," or not at all, during the campaign for the country's "founding" multiparty election in 1992. In 2016, by contrast, NDC and NPP flags hung sideby-side throughout the town center, while opposition activists openly campaigned for political change. While a number of violent incidents between rival supporters showed that tension between the two parties persists, it is important to note that these episodes were typically brief and localized.
These three developments have made it harder for whichever party is in power to count on its voter base. In this increasingly competitive political landscape, presidents are more vulnerable to popular discontent. Similar trends have weakened the position of incumbent presidents in several other countries. In Nigeria, for example, a deteriorating economic environment, the waning credibility of then-President Goodluck Jonathan, and the presence of a number of respected reformers in the opposition All Progressives Congress (APC) facilitated a transfer of power in 2015. In like manner, a period of economic decline in the Gambia, combined with the emergence of businessman Adama Barrow as a credible opposition candidate, contributed to the 2016 electoral defeat of President Yahya Jammeh.
The losses by Mahama, Jonathan, and Jammeh suggest that significant numbers of voters make up their minds according to their percep-tion of the ruling party's economic performance and competence. As Michael Bratton and his coauthors have argued, based on Afrobarometer survey data from eighteen countries, "would-be voters in Africa consider policy performance, especially the government's perceived handling of unemployment, inflation, and income distribution." 11 Further research has found that the voters most likely to vote on the basis of performance and the public good are those who live in urban areas, are more educated, and have experience with interethnic marriage in their families. 12 If these findings are correct, then as levels of urbanization and education increase-as indeed they are across the continent-a growing proportion of African voters will be casting their ballots on the basis of the government's record.
Such changes, however, do not mean that voters are likely to begin swapping parties regularly without regard for partisan or ethnic ties. The Ghanaian experience suggests that voters base their perceptions of a politician's competence, in part, on that politician's perceived willingness to respond to their particular needs. Even in countries such as Kenya, where ethnic identities mean a lot in political life, voting patterns stem from a politics of persuasion whereby citizens are encouraged to view coethnics as the best protectors of their interests-and the country's. 13 Because the politics of ethnicity and the politics of performance often bleed into one another in this manner, voters critical of the ruling party are not always prepared to support the opposition. In such cases, leaders who take their supporters for granted are likely to suffer at the polls not because disappointed supporters will necessarily switch to a rival, but because they may simply stay home.
The Opposition Raises Its Game
None of the foregoing should be taken to suggest that President Mahama's defeat stemmed from economic difficulties alone. The NPP also ran a more effective campaign than it had in the past. It was widely rumored that Akufo-Addo, having lost two elections in a row, would face a leadership challenge should he fail again.
14 Concerns over perceived bias in the EC under Osei, plus the likely difficulty of defeating an incumbent president, moved Addo's allies to work on strengthening the party. Consequently, although the NPP was hampered by a lack of funds after eight years in opposition, it appears to have wielded its resources with new effectiveness.
The new approach took two forms: a more nuanced party message, and new strategies of political mobilization and demobilization. At the national level, the opposition made a number of grand promises. These included a commitment to build one factory per district-a total of 216 in all-and to create an annual development fund of US$1 million for each of the country's 275 parliamentary constituencies to meet local needs. These pledges, which committed the NPP to a level of expen-diture that may prove impossible to deliver, were carefully targeted to compete with President Mahama's claims to have completed "the most massive infrastructural development in the history of this country." Thus, although the NDC was able to boast of having spent more than $700 million on major projects, including the completion of a number of hospitals, it was the NPP that made the most expansive campaign promises.
These pledges went hand-in-hand with a negative campaign that sought to emphasize the ruling party's responsibility for the country's economic malaise. In making this case, the NPP-which recruits many of its leaders from legal and economic elites-stressed its business credentials and depicted NDC leaders as lacking the skills necessary to manage development. These claims were strengthened by a series of corruption scandals, some of which implicated the president and his closest allies. By consistently reinforcing the link between corruption, government waste, and the absence of funds to deal with key challenges such as poor roads and electricity shortages, the NPP painted the government as the main cause of Ghana's economic difficulties. Such tactics helped to undermine public confidence in the ruling party: In our December 2015 survey, just 44 percent of respondents reported trusting the president "a lot" or "somewhat."
These national appeals were supported by a ground campaign that emphasized different messages in different parts of the country. Having learnt the difficulty of converting committed NDC supporters in previous elections, the opposition carefully targeted its efforts. In NPP strongholds, such as Kumasi, the main challenge for the party was not to win over government supporters so much as to foster internal unity and boost turnout among its own backers. 15 To this end, party leaders emphasized the benefits-from small gifts to collective goods such as health clinics-that allied communities would receive following a transfer of power.
The NPP adopted a very different strategy in NDC strongholds. There it built on its status as one of the two parties that dominate the country's political landscape by developing a stronger party infrastructure. As Minion K.C. Morrison notes, one of the most distinctive features of Ghanaian politics is the recurring emergence of two predominant political parties, which in turn reflect two persistent political traditions-a liberal current today represented by the NPP, and a left-populist strain currently associated with the NDC. 16 In 2016, the NPP used its political networks in government heartlands to classify and target voters. First, in higher-density areas in which many voters can be quickly contacted, an "advance party" conducted door-to-door canvassing and local meetings to determine the sentiments of households and communities. Those who were identified as committed NDC supporters were then left alone, while voters who seemed sympathetic to the NPP would receive small gifts such as T-shirts bearing the party's red, white, and blue elephant logo. Voters who seemed "in between," such as disgruntled NDC supporters, heard negative appeals that called the ruling party a failureand that asked its traditional backers to stay at home to facilitate political change.
While in 2016 the NPP did better in NDC strongholds than had been the case in 2012, the key development in these areas was the hit that Mahama's vote total took from dramatically falling turnout. That plus the NPP's stronger performance in its own heartlands and shifts toward NPP majorities in all four swing regions-Brong Ahafo, Central, Greater Accra, and Western-condemned Mahama to the worst electoral performance of any sitting president since multiparty politics came back.
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Political Innovation and Transfers of Power
The kind of opposition political innovation that contributed to the ruling party's defeat in Ghana has also underpinned transfers of power elsewhere. In the case of Ghana, the persistence of a two-party system has limited the extent of political fragmentation. Thus, the main challenges for the NPP were to secure its own unity and then find new ways to reach beyond its home areas. In other countries-those with a dominant ruling party and a fragmented opposition-the parties out of power have faced a more daunting task involving the formation of complex alliances.
Although the construction of stable political coalitions has often failed due to a lack of trust between leaders, the absence of common ground, and weak party structures, 18 the evidence suggests that successive defeats have encouraged opposition parties to take such efforts more seriously. In Nigeria, for example, the creation of a relatively inclusive alliance of northern and southern leaders within the APC limited defections ahead of polling day and laid the basis for Muhammadu Buhari's presidential victory. Similarly, in the Gambia, the decision of a number of factions to bury their differences and form a united front undermined Jammeh's grip on power. Political parties may still represent the "weakest link" in the chain of democratization, 19 but they are neither static nor doomed to repeat their mistakes.
In Ghana, the national election-oversight body has gained strength and undergone innovation over the past twenty years. Since 1992, when the NPP boycotted the parliamentary races in protest of what it said was a rigged presidential vote, a process of steady reform has built opposition confidence in the electoral process. The EC's credibility has had two main sources. The first of these was the personal authority and calming influence of Kwadwo Afari-Gyan, who ran the EC from 1993 to 2015 and announced the first defeat of a ruling party in 2000. The second was the creation in 1994 of the Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC), an arena within which representatives from all main political parties can raise and discuss their electoral concerns. This innovation, which has been attempted in other African countries but rarely systematically or over such a length of time, has enabled the EC to build consensus around a series of reforms, such as the introduction of transparent ballot boxes and new election technology. While Ghana's EC has not eliminated malpractice, it has emerged as one of the most respected commissions on the continent.
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Despite its record of success, however, the EC went into the 2016 elections facing serious questions about its credibility. In 2012, the NPP filed a petition with the Supreme Court challenging the election results and alleging multiple voting, the existence of "ghost" polling stations not on the official list, and the absence of relevant signatures on some forms. Even after the Supreme Court confirmed Mahama's victory, the opposition continued to protest that the election had been fraudulent and predicted that the 2016 polls would be rigged. The NPP's fears were intensified when Afari-Gyan retired in 2015 and was replaced by Osei. The former chairperson of the National Commission for Civic Education, she was an alleged government ally. The 2012 disputes and the change at the top of the EC sapped public confidence to such an extent that in our December 2015 survey, only 24 percent of Ghanaians said that they trusted the body "a lot," while 25 percent reported that they did not trust it "at all."
The EC responded to these challenges as it had to similar criticisms in the past: It made reforms to address identified problems, and it used the IPAC to build agreement between the rival parties. A Special Reform Committee set up to review the 2012 controversy recommended 29 changes. The EC accepted all but two of them-although not all were subsequently implemented. 21 In addition to biometric registration and verification technology, already used in 2012, it adopted a new requirement that party agents would have to receive physical copies of signed polling-station and constituency-level results. Perhaps most significantly, the EC continued to build its cadre of career regional and district election officers. While temporary staffers handled the nuts and bolts of the process, the supervisory presence of these bureaucrats encouraged confidence in the process. Despite NPP concerns about the alleged appointment of NDC supporters to temporary election-oversight posts, the combination of these measures resulted in a high-quality election, which suggests that the EC has developed an institutional strength that extends beyond the personal authority of its top official.
The NPP also changed the way in which it monitored the polls. Building on a strong countrywide network of activists, the opposition developed a mobile-phone application that party agents at the polling-station level could use to record and transmit both the result and a photograph of the signed verification form. The opposition was thus able to con-struct a parallel set of results, which gave party leaders confidence that they had won the presidency well before the EC began releasing the official figures. Along with similar efforts by some media outlets, this initiative ensured that the NPP's gains received widespread early publicity, which, along with the magnitude of their victory, pressured the EC to declare the result and Mahama to concede.
Similar processes of electoral reform have also played an important role in enabling opposition victories in other countries. In Nigeria, for example, the widely praised 2015 election that brought Buhari to power came just eight years after a balloting that drew wide condemnation as among the worst ever seen on the continent. Between these two polls, Nigeria's Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) under well-respected Chairman Attahiru Jega strengthened both its independence and capacity, including the use of biometric registration and verification.
Both incumbents' vulnerability to these trends and the efficacy of election technology have their limits, however. The weak legal standing of most African electoral commissioners, who tend to be appointed by and to serve at the pleasure of the president, means that the ruling party can often easily control a pliant electoral-management body. Moreover, new election technology has a mixed track record, and has typically worked only when there has been the political will to put in place the necessary infrastructure. Most notably, during the controversial Kenyan election of 2013, a new system for transmitting results via mobile phones failed completely, while in Nigeria, many biometricverification machines could not be used on polling day, forcing officials to fall back on manual processes. In short, neither electoralcommission reform nor new technology represents a guarantee of free and fair elections.
Should I Stay or Should I Go?
Economic travails, assertive voters, stronger electoral commissions, and hungry oppositions eager to learn and "raise their game" have increased the pressure on incumbent presidents in many parts of Africa. None of this necessarily translates into more competitive elections and more frequent transfers of power, however. As Robert Dahl famously noted, 22 presidents who face mounting opposition have two choices: They can reform, or they can repress. When incumbents agree to reform, transfers of power become far more likely, as in Ghana and Nigeria. When presidents lash out with coercion, as in Burundi and Chad, hopes for democratic consolidation are most often dashed amid hardening autocracy. Over the past decade, African leaders who have seen defeat looming have tended to choose repression over reform.
Of course, the deployment of repression-which can include arrests of rival leaders, clampdowns on freedom of speech, prohibition of opposition rallies, and the intimidation of civil society groups-is not always effective. In Burkina Faso, public hostility toward President Blaise Compaoré was so entrenched that, when he attempted to change the constitution in 2014 to extend his 27 years in power, opposition leaders were able to mount an uprising that ended with him fleeing to nearby Côte d'Ivoire. But Compaoré's fate is rare. More often than not, coercion has proved highly effective. Partly as a result, a majority of sub-Saharan African countries have never experienced a transfer of power via elections. There are, of course, a number of countries with open political systems in which the ruling party continues to win because it is genuinely popular, such as Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa. But in more authoritarian contexts such as Ethiopia, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, the opposition would likely have made a major breakthrough in the absence of repression and electoral manipulation. 23 This raises an important question: Under what conditions do leaders agree to step down? Cheeseman has argued that presidents are most likely to pursue reform rather than repression when they lack secure access to economic resources, face a united opposition, enjoy limited international backing, and have no reason to fear that they or their allies will suffer a high economic or physical cost if they stand down. 24 The evidence of recent elections highlights the particular significance of the last factor. In Ghana, President Mahama's defeat was a blow to his pride, but is unlikely to lead to his being prosecuted or persecuted by the new government. Instead, Ghanaian politicians have come to a consensus on an extremely generous "golden handshake" that protects the economic interests of losing presidential and parliamentary candidates. Mahama therefore had little to fear from leaving office. 25 Ghana's transfer of power stands in stark contrast with events in the Gambia. 26 There, President Jammeh initially accepted defeat in the 1 December 2016 election, only to change his mind eight days later. Publicly, he cited as justification his growing belief that the election had been rigged. During the period between the two statements, no evidence of electoral manipulation had emerged, but election victor Adama Barrow did state that he would prosecute the outgoing president for crimes committed during his time in office. Gambian politicians such as Fatoumata Jallow-Tambajang, one of the main architects of the opposition alliance, also rejected softer options, such as allowing the president to go into exile. 27 Seen in this light, Jammeh's about-face was driven not by a Ghanaian politicians have come to a consensus on an extremely generous "golden handshake" that protects the economic interests of losing presidential and parliamentary candidates.
love of power for power's sake, but by an instinct for self-preservation. After a standoff that lasted for several weeks, Jammeh, persuaded to rethink his position following the first stages of a largely bloodless military intervention by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), finally agreed to leave power once he had secured the right to go into exile in a third country willing to guarantee his safety. The ex-president fled to Equatorial Guinea on the night of 21 January 2017. According to a source from the incoming administration, he took advantage of his last weeks in office to ensure his future comfort by stealing more than $11 million.
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The tumultuous events in the Gambia demonstrate both the waning power of incumbency and the capacity of even defeated presidents to impede political change when their personal safety is at stake. Despite a clear electoral outcome, only international intervention put an end to Jammeh's intransigence. Meanwhile, victories for incumbent leaders in poor-quality elections in Uganda and Zambia in 2016 illustrate that, while the challenges facing presidents are growing in many countries, the power of incumbency remains formidable.
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